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ABSTRACT 
We examine whether board characteristics affect firms’ decision to voluntarily disclose informative 
information about their risk profiles. We base our study on data from 320 listed firms in nine MENA 
emerging markets (789 observations) over the period from 2007 to 2009. Our study offers significant 
contributions to the growing risk disclosure literature. It provides new empirical evidence that 
information driven by some board characteristics affects the perceived relevance of narrative risk 
information. Our findings suggest that the composition of the board and its size enhance the 
informativeness of risk disclosure as it allows investors to better predict future earnings growth. A 
further finding is that a CEO/Chairperson duality does not impact the way investors trust risk 
disclosures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A significant body of research suggests that effective governance structure significantly 
influences disclosure quality and leads to greater corporate transparency (Dechow et al., 1996; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997and Beekes and Brown, 2006). The link between governance mechanisms 
and the quality of accounting information is based on the view that corporate governance influences 
the reliability of firm disclosure through its influence over management activities, their 
opportunistic behavior and the integrity of the financial reporting process (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986). Actually, the separation of ownership and control leads to agency conflicts between corporate 
managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Insiders and controlling shareholders-
better informed about corporate opportunities and uncertainties- have greater incentives to 
expropriate wealth from minority investors and to withhold private information from outsiders 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Such an opportunistic behavior should be reduced when corporate 
governance becomes more effective. Effective governance policies should alleviate the moral 
hazard (hidden action) and the adverse selection (hidden information) problems resulting from a 
severe information gap between managers, shareholders and potential investors (Bushman et al., 
2004). It is established indeed, that implemented governance policies and the amount of information 
disclosed are at the board’s discretion.  A greater accountability and a rich information environment 
are as such, at the heart of better structured boards. This information might be useful for investors 
seeking to reduce the information uncertainty by enabling them to anticipate corporate prospects. It 
should also build a trustworthy relationship between a company and the business community (e.g. 
financial analysts, creditors…), help investors in making informed investment decisions and 
improve the market liquidity by reducing the cost of capital. Nevertheless, in the absence of strong 
boards’ monitoring on managerial behavior, managers could mislead outsiders by providing 
accounting information which does not portray the true underlying risks and rewards of the business. 
Accordingly, the ‘informativeness’ of corporate disclosures and their ultimate effect on share prices 
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may differ considerably depending on the effectiveness of  internal governance mechanisms and on 
the ways the information is prepared, conveyed and used (Hossain and Reaz, 2007).  
Recent trends in the accounting literature examined how corporate governance characteristics 
influence firms’ decision to reveal sensitive information such as risk disclosure in both high and low 
regulated environments. Studies like Abdallah et al, (2015), Abraham and Cox, (2007), Allini et al., 
(2016), Elshandidy and Neri, (2015) and Lajili, (2009) suggest in particular, that it is the well-
structured board of directors (size, composition, diversity…) itself that could outweigh the 
entrenchment incentives of the manager and constrains him to adopt the best risk disclosure policy. 
Such evidence remains, though, limited on how board structure influences the extent of risk 
disclosure and little is known about how it might influence investors’ reliance on risk information. 
Recent studies on the usefulness of risk disclosure indicate indeed that investors tend to impound 
such information into their pricing decision. Such practice affects either their risk perceptions (e.g. 
Bao and Datta, 2014; Kravet and Muslu, 2013) or improves the market liquidity and reduces the 
information asymmetry (e.g. Miihkinen, 2013 and Campbell et al., 2014). This should result in an 
accurate assessment of the firm’s future performance.  
Despite the growing literature, little attention has been paid to distinguish mandatory from 
voluntary risk disclosure in either observing how effective governance influences the amount of risk 
disclosure or in how risk reporting of well governed firms impacts on market indicators (Elshandidy 
and Neri, 2015). It is theorized indeed, that these two forms of disclosure have different incentives 
and distinct observed usefulness (Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter, 2012). Moumen et al (2015) is a 
notable exception. They show that voluntary risk disclosure helps investors impound future earnings 
news into stock returns, yet such informativeness is moderated by the presence of proprietary costs. 
Accordingly, albeit the distinct facets of the relationship between corporate governance and risk 
disclosure policy that can be and indeed have been investigated, we focus on an area that has not 
been fully researched so far. We investigate whether and if so, how the monitoring function of the 
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board of directors impacts the credibility of the firms' risk disclosure, causing more/less voluntary 
risk information to be impounded into stock prices. In particular, we examine how board size, board 
composition in non-executive directors and duality of leadership (CEO/Chairman) position interact 
with voluntary risk disclosure to influence investors’ ability to anticipate future earnings growth. 
We refer to voluntary risk information as any information about risk that appears in the narrative 
sections of annual reports other than those required by the international financial reporting standards 
(IFRS).  
Building on prior market based accounting literature (Lundholm and Myers, 2002; 
Athanasakou and Hussainey, 2014; Moumen et al, 2015; and Muslu et al., 2014) we define risk 
disclosure informativeness as the extent to which risk reporting reduces market uncertainty about 
corporate business and conveys information about its future prospects to outside investors. 
Informative risk disclosure should, consequently, help investors form better expectations about 
future earnings and impound more firm-specific information into share prices.  
Our study contributes then to the recent literature on risk disclosure by providing insights into 
the potential benefits of the voluntary risk reporting practice of well governed firms to market 
participants. On the one hand, while corporate governance is a considerably researched topic in the 
accounting literature, its impact (Cohen et al., 2004) on the informativeness of accounting 
information in general and risk disclosure in particular remains as far as we know under scrutinized. 
Wang and Hussainey (2013), in a closely related study, show that governance-driven voluntary 
disclosures of forward-looking statements enhance the share price informativeness about future 
earnings. Yet several important questions remain unanswered. Specifically, we still have no 
knowledge of which firm-specific governance mechanisms matter for risk disclosure 
informativeness. Unlike Wang and Hussainey (2013), we believe that not all aspects of monitoring 
mechanisms may enhance informed trading by ensuring the production of informative risk 
disclosure. Moreover, considering a single country context (UK) does not confirm the robustness of 
Board Structure and Informativeness of Risk Disclosure 
 6 
 
the evidence not only across multiple developed markets but also among emerging markets. Yu 
(2011) argues that the impact of firm-specific governance on gathering and trading private 
information can vary with the degree of investors’ protection offered by country-level governance. 
Elshandidy et al. (2014) suggest also that international differences in voluntary risk reporting 
practices depend on the country's legal system and its cultural values. On the other hand, recent 
studies address risk reporting in developed countries with established risk reporting legislations and 
little is known about developing countries, such as Middle Eastern and North African (henceforth 
called MENA) emerging economies. In such context, risk reporting regulation is still limited to the 
financial risk factor and thus most risk disclosure is provided on a voluntary basis. Moumen et al 
(2015) call besides, for more evidence on the informational properties of risk disclosure in MENA 
emerging markets. A contradiction between the newly introduced governance policies and the 
prevalent accounting values (secrecy and conservatism) within the region is quite obvious.  
So far, despite their growing importance, stock markets in the MENA region have been widely 
ignored by international investors and academic research until the early 2000s (Bley, 2011). This is 
mainly due to imposed restrictions on foreign stock ownership, the lack of common accounting 
standards and the limited corporate governance and transparency. Furthermore, unlike developed 
capital markets (e.g. NYSE, LSE, TSE), MENA emerging markets are characterized by 
heterogeneous size, trading activity and informational efficiency, which are basically caused by 
market depth and corporate governance factors (Ben Othman and Zeghal, 2010). Our study provides 
interesting evidence which is inconsistent with the observation that stock prices fail to reflect all 
available information due to some market imperfections. We show that risk information associated 
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with good board characteristics (large size and high proportion of non-executive directors) enhance 
the market's ability to anticipate future earnings growth.  
BACKGROUND 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has many elements- be they legal, economic, 
financial or cultural- that offer a favorable context for an analysis linking corporate disclosure 
quality to their evolving governance characteristics. MENA countries follow a mixed legal system, 
where the body of law is a combination of several legal traditions, including the Islamic Sharia, 
French civil law and English common law. As former British and French colonies (except for 
Turkey), they inherited their business milieu and accounting values from mother legal countries. 
Major institutions regarding financial markets, investors’ protection and the accounting systems 
were therefore established following the Western models, although some specific features make 
them an interesting fieldwork (Turk Ariss, 2009). Actually, the cultural context in MENA countries 
is characterized by a preference for secrecy and uncertainty avoidance, which is encouraged by a 
weak regulation, deficient law enforcement and the absence of non -compliance costs (Al-Akra et 
al., 2009; Al-Omari, 2010; Samaha and Dahawy, 2011).  
The prevalent accounting system is rather leaning towards statutory control, uniformity, 
conservatism and secrecy whereby corporate disclosure  and  the  average  of  investors’  protection  
are lower  than  common  law  countries  (Ben  Othman  and  Zeghal,  2008). 
In recent decades, most MENA countries experienced financial restructuring initiatives that 
aimed to develop their stock exchanges and to comply with international recommendations on 
matters such as investment regulation and governance codes of best practices. This dynamism was 
steered by a desire to foster the economic diversification in the region. The development of private 
sector activities and the improvement of economic freedom and property rights were a priority for 
policymakers. On the one hand, the exploitation of abundant oil resources in Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries created new opportunities for investment and for raising savings (Baydoun 
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et al, 2013). As a result, a significant flow of funds into the financial sector led to calls for raising 
standards of corporate accountability and for governance reforms, which slowly gained traction on 
the political agenda (Koldertsova, 2011). On the other hand, countries with scarce petrochemical 
resources engaged in financial reforms to attract foreign investment and to raise considerable funds 
for large scale infrastructure projects. Consequently, policymakers were prompted to rebuild their 
capital markets’ institutional and legal frameworks. This was expected to promote efficient 
governance codes, improve investors’ protection and enact new financial disclosure requirements 
that converge with international standards (McNally, 2011).  
In spite of this common economic reform trajectory, the MENA region stock markets have 
achieved differing degrees of development. Turkey, Israel, UAE, and Egypt are perceived as fast 
emerging markets and in some respect moving closer to the standards of developed countries. 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Morocco are still considered as frontier markets (Rejichi et al, 2014). 
Market capitalization in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries rose from 244$ billion 
in 2002 to more than $1,153$ billion in 2012 which represents 40.36 % of MENA’s GDP and about 
2.17% of world market capitalization (World Development Indicators, WDI 2012). By the end of 
2012, Jordan and Qatar show the most important markets capitalization in the MENA region with 
approximately 87.3 % of GDP and 66.5 % of GDP while the United Arab of Emirates (UAE) stock 
market seems to be the least developed (18.25% of GDP).  
Saudi Arabia and Turkey security markets, followed by the Israeli market, have conversely  the 
highest market trading value while the Tunisian market is among the smallest for most performance 
indicators, including market capitalization (19.64 % of GDP), and market trading value (2.76 % of 
GDP).  Measured by the number of listed companies, Israel’s (532), Turkey’s (405) and Jordan’s 
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(243) markets have the highest  number  of  listed  firms  in  the  region  while  Qatar and Bahrain  
have the smallest with respectively 42 and 43 listed companies. 
We provide further details about market capitalization, market trading values, the number of 
listed firm for MENA emerging markets in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
Considering the notable development of MENA stock exchanges, there were a growing focus 
on better implementation of laws and regulations. Governments and private sector participants have 
been striving to improve governance standards and much has been achieved in a relatively short 
time period. So far, most MENA countries issued governance codes for listed companies and the 
issues now relate to implementation of those codes, particularly in the areas of disclosure, risk 
management and board practices. Recall that the 2006 financial crash in the region was particularly 
linked to capital market uncertainty and the inadequacy of information held by a plethora of 
investors in relation to their investments. Therefore, regional authorities devoted considerable 
efforts to enhance the financial literacy of investors and to improve the information flow to the 
investing public (McNally, 2011). Corporate governance reform in MENA can’t be seen then as 
investor driven since much of the burden of ensuring proper implementation falls on the regional 
regulators. The incurred benefits have been indeed seen by listed firms in terms of better strategic 
decision making and voluntary regulatory compliance rather than being associated with an access 
to lower cost of capital. It follows that while all governance codes should have been benchmarked 
against international best practices, they have been customized to work in the local environment.1 
MENA companies are still characterized by a high ownership concentration (mainly family or state-
owned) and a limited protection of minority shareholders. There is also no call for separating the 
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chair of the board and the chief executive officer (CEO) positions which is likely to impede the 
board independence (Turki and Ben Sedrine, 2012).  
Accordingly, the differences in ownership structures, the regulatory frameworks, and the nature 
of agency issues within MENA emerging markets compared to developed ones present an 
interesting fieldwork for evaluating the empirical outcomes of such reforms on risk disclosure policy 
of better governed firms. 
RELEVANT LITERATURE REVIEW 
Risk disclosure literature emerged in the last decade as a response to corporate’s move towards 
extensive non-financial and forward-looking disclosures. The trend of dissatisfaction with the 
shortcomings of historical financial information and the new disclosure standards on business 
exposures triggered interests in risk reporting attributes, incentives and their informativeness. 
Unfortunately, the evidence on how informative this practice has been is mixed, though researchers 
addressed the usefulness of risk disclosures through mainly the lenses of investors’ risk perception. 
Early evidence like Schrand, (1997) and Rajgopal, (1999) focused narrowly on quantitative 
disclosures on matters such as market risks and found that such practice is associated with lower 
stock price sensitivity and trading volume. Conversely, recent studies such as Kothari et al. (2009), 
Kravet and Muslu, (2013) and Campbell et al, (2014) showed that qualitative risk information 
(including market risk) is associated with higher stock return volatility and trading volume, 
increased dispersion of earnings forecasts and lower bid-ask spreads following the filing date. These 
conflicting results impede a firm conclusion about risk disclosure informativeness. They suggest a 
revival of interest in the topic, especially when most of these evidences are based on mandated risk 
factors in the US context. Additionally, it is unclear how incrementally useful were these risk 
measures to investors, particularly in a rich information environment where equivalent information 
may be available to the market from sources other than financial statements or MD&A sections. 
Furthermore, as we are aware of recent debate (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Hou et al. 2006) on 
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whether firm-specific return variation measures noise trading or information trading, one should be 
cautious when interpreting and relying on these findings. Accordingly, to avoid potential distortion 
to our conclusions due to such empirical choices and following Athanasakou and Hussainey, (2014) 
and Muslu et al., (2014) we rely on the future earnings response coefficients in assessing the 
informational properties of risk disclosure of well-governed firms.  Recall that such proxy is a 
widely-used measure of how much accounting information reveals news about future earnings that 
investors impound into stock prices (Yu, 2011). 
The literature on how corporate governance (CG) mechanisms shape the informativeness of 
risk disclosure is, as far as we know, scarce despite the growing studies -mostly in developed 
countries- suggesting that corporate governance and risk disclosure are interrelated (Abraham and 
Cox, 2007; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Lajili, 2009; Ntim et al., 2013; Oliveira et al., 2011). This 
considerably limits our understanding of how CG mechanisms might promote or impede the 
informational properties of risk reporting. Moreover, although academic interest in risk disclosure 
has substantially evolved recently, a comprehensive theoretical framework for examining corporate 
incentives for engaging in it and assessing its usefulness is yet to emerge (Ntim et al, 2013, Rajab 
and Handley Schachler, 2009). Following the theoretical work of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), we 
suggest that better CG mechanisms enhance the cost–benefit trade-off for information-based trading 
and thus promote the efficient incorporation of risk information into stock prices. This is based on 
the belief that an effective corporate governance system ensures better stewardship of companies. 
This should lead to the provision of credible risk information and reduce investors’ uncertainty about 
future earnings. However, not all aspects of corporate governance mechanisms may matter for 
informed trading and accordingly improve investors’ reliance on risk disclosure. It follows that 
several hypotheses are developed based on the agency theory to identify and link specific elements 
of governance to risk disclosure informativeness. Past studies (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Allini et 
al, 2016; Barakat and Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy et al, 2013; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Lajili, 
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2009) identified some governance attributes that can affect corporate risk disclosure. This study 
draws from this, the corporate governance (Beekes and Brown, 2006; Habib, 2008; Bozec and 
Bozec, 2012), the voluntary disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 2004; Cheng and 
Courtenay, 2006) and the share price informativeness (Ferreira et al, 2011; Yu, 2011) literature, to 
investigate how informative are risk disclosures made by better governed firms in the MENA 
emerging markets. Distinct from most prior studies, we explore how firm-level CG quality in the 
form of board characteristics (i.e. Board size, non-executive directors, and board leadership 
structure) influences the amount of future earnings news impounded into stock prices. 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Board Size 
Corporate governance literature links the effectiveness of boards’ monitoring role to their size. 
On the one hand, it is argued that a small board lacks sufficient expertise and may suffer from chief 
executive officer (CEO) dominance. This impairs the board's ability to meet corporate governance 
responsibilities and involves high agency costs (Bassett et al. 2007).  
On the other hand, the agency theory and the resource dependence theory suggest that large 
boards enjoy wide expertise and more diversified knowledge which results in more effective 
monitoring role. It should also motivate managers to maximize firm value instead of pursuing 
personal objectives, especially in corporations with a higher ownership concentration, and where 
insider shareholders are well represented on the boards (Linsley et al., 2006). It follows that an 
effective managerial monitoring by large and experimented boards can ensure reliable and regular 
information made available to the public, including risk information and performance (Bozec and 
Bozec, 2012). In particular, those with financial and accounting backgrounds, should be more 
motivated  to  screen their  efforts  in  risk management  and  to signal  this  information  to 
shareholders (Elzahar  and Hussainey, 2012). The  empirical  evidence  on  the  association  between  
board size  and  risk disclosure  is  inconclusive. Some studies (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012) find 
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no relationship between board size and risk reporting while others find a positive association 
(Elshandidy and Neri, 2015; Elshandidy et al, 2013; Mokhtar and Mellett, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013). 
This reflects the increase of board members' awareness regarding their duties to enhance corporate 
disclosure. Large board size is likely to increase the diversity of the members’ expertise and 
guarantees a high level of compliance with the accountability paradigm. Based on these arguments 
and congruent with the agency theory, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H1: The informativeness of voluntary risk disclosure with respect to future earnings is stronger 
for firms with a large board size. 
Board Composition 
Board composition is also emphasized as an important corporate governance mechanism in the 
accounting literature. Abraham and Cox (2007) argue that the board of directors includes a mix of 
inside and outside directors with variant tendencies toward disclosure. On the one hand, inside 
directors are full time corporate employees and occupy an executive position within the firm. They 
lack sufficient incentives regarding enhanced corporate disclosure because of their stewardship 
within the firm and their behavior may be open to more scrutiny (Abraham and Cox, 2007). On the 
other hand, outside non-executive directors are expected to provide independent advice to executive 
directors. They are believed to play a crucial role in monitoring managers’ performance and limiting 
their opportunism which may lead to reduced agency conflicts between managers and owners (e.g., 
Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
Because they aim to signal their competence to other potential employers and to maintain their 
reputational capital, non-executive directors are expected to be more effective in fulfilling 
shareholders’ preference for accountability and transparency. Therefore more relevant disclosure is 
expected if they are actually carrying out their greater control and monitoring of managerial 
decisions. Their dominance would provide more power to force managers to disclose more private 
information (Eng and Mak, 2003). Empirically, the association between board composition and 
Board Structure and Informativeness of Risk Disclosure 
 14 
 
disclosure is controversial. Some studies find a positive association between independent directors 
in the board and the level or the quality of corporate voluntary disclosure (Boesso and Kumar, 2007; 
Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Forker, 1992; Gul and Leung, 2004; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Samaha et 
al. 2015; Wang and Hussainey, 2013) while others end to an insignificant relationship between the 
two variables (Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Ho and Wong, 2001). Focusing on risk reporting, 
Abraham and Cox (2007) show that despite the benefits (knowledge, specific expertise…) 
dependent non-executive directors may bring to the firm, they do not promote risk disclosure. 
Conversely, independent directors are important in making risk information publicly known to 
investors. Elshandidy et al. (2013), Lajili, (2009), Ntim et al, (2013) and Oliveira et al, (2011) 
corroborate this evidence while Allini et al (2016) and Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) did not confirm 
such association.  
Based on the above arguments and consistent with the agency theory, we postulate that:   
H2:  The informativeness of voluntary risk disclosure with respect to future earnings is stronger 
for firms with high proportion of non-executive directors. 
CEO/Chairman Duality 
Board leadership structure is also considered as an important corporate governance mechanism. 
The CEO/Chairman duality occurs if the chief executive officer (CEO) holds the chairman position 
of the board at the same time resulting in a unitary leadership structure. According to the agency 
theory, concentration of decision-making power due to the unitary leadership structure can 
significantly reduce the monitoring function of the board. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that this 
combination of positions signals the absence of separation of decision management and decision 
control may erode board independence and facilitate managers’ opportunistic behavior. Therefore, 
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it is posited that for the board to be effective, it is important to separate the CEO and chairman 
positions.  
Forker (1992) suggests that duality may be detrimental to the quality of disclosure. Actually, 
the dominant personalities may resist some governance and control mechanisms such as audit 
committee and non-executive directors, which may place pressure on the board and impair their 
governance role regarding disclosure policies. Ho and Wong, (2001) believe that separating the 
CEO  and  the  board  chairman  position  should support transparency and adequate corporate 
disclosure by deterring  managers from withholding  unfavorable  information. Empirical studies 
provide mixed results. Some studies report a negative association between role duality and corporate 
voluntary disclosure (Forker, 1992; Gul and Leung, 2004; Khlif et al., 2014; Wang and Hussainey, 
2013). Other studies find an insignificant association between CEO duality and the extent of 
informative voluntary disclosure (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Ho and Wong, 2001; Sarikhani and 
Ebrahimi, 2011). Within the  risk disclosure  literature,  most recent studies (Elzahar  and Hussainey, 
2012; Elshandidy et al, 2013; Mokhtar and Mellet,  2013; Ntim et al, 2013) find  no significant  
relationship between  role  duality  and voluntary risk reporting. 
Based on the arguments above and consistent with the agency theory, we formulate our last 
hypothesis as follows:   
H3:  The informativeness of voluntary risk disclosure with respect to future earnings is weaker 
for firms with CEO/Chairman duality. 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample Selection and Data Collection 
This paper examines the extent to which the informativeness of voluntary risk disclosure differs 
between strongly and weakly monitored firms for a sample of companies listed in a number of 
Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) emerging markets. As far as we know, the countries 
studied have not been examined extensively, despite the growing importance of the region with 
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respect to commerce and foreign direct investment. MENA stock markets are good examples of 
newly emerging capital markets of significant interest to world investors and policymakers, after 
the massive privatization and adjustment plans introduced in the region. These markets have 
recently come under scrutiny of international organizations such as World Bank, International 
Monetary fund and Standard & Poor’s which played a vital role in stimulating investment.  
Transparency is not particularly part of the culture in the region. However, companies are 
improving their disclosure practices in response to pressures from the regulators. International 
financial reporting standards (IFRS) are in fact required in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and UAE.  
Other MENA countries such as Tunisia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Israel are converging to IFRS 
(Pacter report, 2014) to attract international investors and to enhance corporate disclosure. 
The original sample covered twelve MENA emerging markets, however, we applied some 
filtering rules to ensure data availability and sample homogeneity.2 Mainly, we dropped Israel from 
our initial sample because in this country firms are dually listed and provide annual reports in 
conformity with the SEC requirements (10-K form).3 Bahrain and Qatar were also dropped because 
their capital markets include mostly financial and investment corporations and due to severe issues 
of data availability. Our final sample comprises companies from nine MENA countries, including 
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and UAE that are 
periodically listed from 2007 to 2012 in their stock exchanges. The choice of this period of analysis 
is triggered by the steady growth in GDP per capita in the region during these recent years as well 
as the dynamism in their stock markets with a considerable increase in market capitalization and 
total value traded. 
The firms included in our sample, had to satisfy three conditions: First, it had to belong to a 
non-financial sector. Financial firms such as banks, insurance firms and investment firms were 
excluded because their reports are not comparable to those of non-financial firms. Second, this study 
focuses on annual reports and no other media of financial communications such as interim reports. 
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Third, the non-financial firm, had to have at least one annual report, from 2007-2009. We chose 
2009 as the end year for the study because the level of corporate risk disclosure is linked to share 
price anticipation of earnings and accounting and return data are required for at least three years 
ahead (Year 2012). The initial number of available annual reports varies from year to year. For 
example, the total number of firms in 2007 is 328. This number increases in 2008 to 335 firms. Then 
it is reduced to 327 firms in 2009. See Table 2 for the sample composition by country. 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
We matched the selected companies with the Thomson one database codes from which we 
gathered financial information such as stock prices, earnings per share and assets growth. Some 
firms have no Thomson one code. Thus, they have no accounting and return data. These firms were 
excluded from the selected sample. In the second stage we collected governance variables with 
respect to board characteristics from Thomson one database as well as corporate annual reports and 
we dropped other firms from our sample because of some missing information. Before we perform 
the regression analysis, outliers are censored to avoid any undue influence of extreme observations. 
Outliers are defined in this study as the top and bottom 1% of observations for the distribution of 
any of the regression variables.  After these series of sample-filtering steps the sample is reduced 
from 990 to 789 observations. The resulting panel includes 320 companies. The average number of 
annual reports per company is about 2.5.  
Research Design 
Measuring Voluntary Risk Disclosure 
Accounting literature relied on the content analysis method as a main approach to measure the 
extent of corporate risk disclosure (e.g., Abraham and Cox, 2007; Amran et al. 2009; Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004; Dobler et al, 2011; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012). The 
coding method can be computer-aided (Allini et al, 2016; Elshandidy et al, 2013; Kothari et al., 
2009; Kravet and Muslu, 2013) or human coded (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Beretta & Bozzolan, 
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2004; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Moumen et al, 2015). Either method 
may employ the word, sentence or lines as the unit of analysis. Alini et al, (2016), Elzahar and 
Hussainey, (2012), Elshandidy et al, (2013) and Muslu et al. (2013) use the sentence as the unit of 
analysis.  
Others (Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Dobler et al, 2011; Miihkinen, 2012) refer to disclosure 
indices and the number of items to assess the level of risk disclosure.  
Our study adopts the manual method and uses the sentence as the text unit but may be 
distinguished from the previous research in many respects. First, we opt for the manual approach to 
ensure a better judgment of words and phrases meaning within a context, especially as we deal with 
data in different languages.4 Second, we measure the level of voluntary risk disclosures as opposed 
to bad or good news (Kothari et al., 2009) or forward-looking information (Muslu et al., 2013). 
Third, as in Kothari et al. (2009), we count the number of risk related sentences in all the narrative 
sections of annual report rather than restricting the search to one specific section (e.g., Management 
and Discussion Analysis (MD&A): Muslu et al., 2013) or to a different vehicle of financial 
information (e.g. Interim reports: Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012) . The following sub-sections discuss 
the steps involved.  
Manual Content Analysis Steps 
Following Linsley and Shrives (2006), we adopt a broad definition of risk to capture any risk-
related sentence in corporate annual reports. We code risk disclosures every sentence that informs 
the reader about “any opportunity or prospect, or of any hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure, 
that has already impacted or may impact upon the company, as well as the management of any such 
opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, threat, or exposure”. We consider, therefore, risk disclosures 
any information provided in annual reports that outlines the firms' risks and opportunities and their 
expected economic impact on future performance. It encompasses forward-looking information, 
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information that explains the source of uncertainty surrounding the firm's future outcomes and 
historical and forward-looking information about the management of such risks.  
Since categorical and thematic distinctions are required in content analysis approach, we refer 
furthermore, to Linsley and Shrives (2006) grid as a coding instrument. We retain five categories of 
risk information and we drop the financial risk category. Most MENA emerging markets adopted 
the international financial reporting standards (IFRS) and are providing the mandatory information 
about their market risk (Currency, liquidity and credit risks).  
The disclosure index (Appendix A) reflects five categories of voluntary risk information 
whereby 32 items were identified.  
Consistent with Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Elzahar and Hussainey (2012), we had to 
adhere to some decision rules. First, because the definition of risk is broad, disclosures had to be 
explicitly mentioned and not merely implied. Moreover, we coded risk disclosure sentence any 
disclosure that is repeated each time it is discussed. Any sentence with more than one possible 
classification was classified into the category most emphasized within the sentence. We then 
generated an aggregated score for risk disclosure for each firm by counting the number of risk-
related sentences in corporate annual reports.  
Reliability of Risk Disclosure Scores 
We check the reliability and validity of the risk disclosure scores in two stages. To ensure 
reproducibility, we used one single coder to perform content analysis. Then, to increase confidence 
that the interpretation of a written document corresponds to objective reality, we used an 
experienced researcher familiar with the technique of content analysis to code, independently, a sub 
sample of 5 firms. The sub samples were selected randomly from the yearly pool of observations 
from 2007 to 2009 for a total of 15 observations. Before we began the study, we discussed risk 
disclosure and research objective with the coder to familiarize him with relevant literature. 
Additionally, we provided the coder with a set of rules to replicate the pretest coding and in the 
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process; we clarified and refined the rules as needed.  As the coder and the researcher independently 
coded the initial sample, we used tests of inter rater reliability to check for consistency in coding, a 
proxy for accuracy. Consistent with Krippendorff (2010), we relied on Krippendorff’s alpha test, 
which is considered to be the most appropriate test of inter rater reliability. The test generated a 
Kalpha of 0.889, a satisfactory level of inter-rater reliability for this intra-class agreement 
coefficient. It is customary to require Kalpha= 0.80 as the cut off point for a good reliability test, 
with a minimum of 0.67.  
Regression Model Specification 
We follow the recent trend in the accounting literature (e.g. Athanasakou and Hussainey, 2014; 
Lundholm and Myers, 2002; Moumen et al, 2015; Muslu et al., 2014) to assess the effect of 
corporate governance on risk disclosure informativeness. We refer to Collins et al. (1994) regression 
model (FERC) to assess the amount of revealed future earnings news impounded into current stock 
returns.  
Collins et al (1994) applied the following specification: 
t
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where:  Rt: stock return for year t, 
Rt+1, Rt+2, Rt+3: stock returns for year t+1, t+2, t+3 respectively, 
Xt, Xt+1, Xt+2, Xt+3: are defined as the earnings change for year t, t+1, t+2, and t+3 
respectively, 
AGt: is the growth rate of the total book value of assets for period t, 
EPt-1: is the period t-1’s earnings over price at the start of period t. 
Consistent with Lundholm  and  Myers (2002) we interact all right-hand side variables in 
Collins et al (1994) regression model with risk disclosure (RD) variable and all corporate 
governance variables (Govi) each one a part so that we detect the simultaneous effect of these 
(1) 
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explanatory variables on the association between stock return and future earnings. Using three-way 
interaction terms will help us assess the effect of CG mechanisms on the information properties of 
risk disclosure in a single step. This is because estimating FERC model in non US countries is 
challenging since in smaller capital markets, the number of firms within each industry might be 
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insufficient to run the FERC regression analysis in 2 steps (Yu, 2011). This yields to the following 
regression model:
 
 
 
where:  Rt = stock return for year t is the buy-and-hold returns from six months before the 
financial year-end to six months after the financial year-end, 
Xt  = earnings change per share deflated by the share price at the start of the return 
window for period t, 
Xt+1, Xt+2, Xt+3 = the earnings change per share for year t+1, t+2, t+3 respectively 
deflated by the price at the start of the return window for period t, 
Rt+1, Rt+2, Rt+3 = stock return for year t+1, t+2, t+3 are calculated as buy-and-hold returns 
for the 12-month period, 
AGt = the growth rate of total book value of assets for period t,  
EPt-1: = period t–1’s earnings over price six months after the financial year-end of period 
t–1, 
RD = risk disclosure defined as the natural logarithm of the number of risk-related 
sentences, respectively, for operation risk, empowerment risk, information processing 
and technology risk, integrity risk and strategic risk,  
Govi = corporate governance vector including:  
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- Board size variable (BS) = the number of directors sitting on the board at the end 
of each year. This measure is consistent with Abdel-Fattah et al. (2008) and 
Elzahar and Hussainey (2012).  
- Board composition (NED) = the proportion of non-executive directors relative to 
the Board size consistent with Abraham and Cox (2007); Elshandidy et al (2013); 
and Elzahar and Hussainey (2012). 
- The CEO/Chairman role duality (Dual) = a dummy variable that we defined as 1 
if CEO is the Chairman and 0 otherwise.  
The controlling variables include the following: 
- Financial leverage = the book value of equity scaled by total liabilities (consistent with 
Elshandidy et al (2013), 
- Firm size = the natural logarithm of corporate net sales (turnover) congruent with 
Abraham and Cox (2007) and Linsley and Shrives (2006), 
- Profitability = the natural logarithm of the return on equity (ROE) which is defined as 
the [Net profit after tax/Shareholders funds] *100% in accordance with Elshandidy et 
al (2013) and Elzahar and Hussainey (2012), 
- Industry sector = a dummy variable defined as 1 if the firm is classified into one of the 
nine broadly defined industry sectors and 0 otherwise.  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
We provide in Table 3 summary statistics for our samples with observations coming from the 
year 2007 to 2009. The mean current return ranges between 2.9 and 3 percent. The mean current 
earnings per share change varies between 0.5 and 0.9 percent of the price. The aggregated mean of 
future earnings change is respectively 0.23 and 0.5 percent of the price for the three period ahead 
t+1, t+2 and t+3. These statistics suggest a decline in future performance in t+1, t+2 and t+3 
compared to the performance of the current period. We find also a lower mean future return with 
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respect to t+1 periods compared to current return. There is a reverse and an increase in the mean 
stock returns for period t+2 and t+3 (compared to t+1) which indicate changes in corporate 
performance over the sample time period. As additionally reported in Table 3, the mean of corporate 
asset growth rate extends from 12.2 to 12.7 percent and the standard deviation is about 0.17 
suggesting that there is little variation in the asset growth rate among our sample firms. The level of 
risk disclosure is on average 27 sentences and the standard deviation is on average 21.3 reflecting a 
fairly low disclosure score over our period of analysis as well as considerable dispersion among our 
sample firms. With respect to board characteristics, board size (BS) ranges from 2 members of 
directors to 23 members of directors with a mean of 8.20 and a standard deviation of 2.42. Board 
composition in non-executive (outside) directors ranges from 0 to 100 percent with an average of 
68.10 percent. This refers to a relatively good level of board independence in listed MENA 
companies. The CEO/chairman role duality exists among 29.78 percent of our sample firms. 70.22 
percent of observations opted for a separate position which is likely to foster board monitoring role. 
Insert Table 3 About Here 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics for the sample firms using data pooled across the three 
year sample period. The earnings per share measure is a Reuters’ fundamentals item, calculated by 
dividing ‘earnings for ordinary-full tax’ by the number of shares outstanding. Xt, Xt+1, Xt+2 and Xt+3 
are defined as earnings change deflated by price. Both current and future earnings changes are 
deflated by the price at the start of the return window for period t.  Rt, Rt+1, Rt+2 and Rt+3 are calculated 
as buy-and-hold returns (inclusive of dividends) over a 12-month period, starting six months after 
the end of the previous financial year. EPt–1 is defined as period t–1’s earnings over price six months 
after the financial year-end of period t–1. AGt is the growth rate of the total book value of assets for 
period t. RD is the total number of risk related sentences. Unlogged values are reported. In 
subsequent regressions the natural logarithm is used. BS is the number of directors sitting on the 
board at the end of each year. NED is the proportion of non-executive directors relative to the Board 
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size. Financial leverage Lev is defined as book value of equity scaled by total liabilities. Size is 
measured by corporate revenues. Profit is measured by the Return on Equity (ROE). Likewise, 
unlogged values are reported and in subsequent regressions the natural logarithm is used. 
Table 4 presents pairwise Pearson correlations for all regression variables. Correlations are 
estimated using pooled data across the three-year sample period. The correlation between current 
Returns (Rt) and current earnings growth (Xt) is strong and significant at the 1% level suggesting 
that current earnings are perceived as value relevant. The correlation between Rt and Xt+1 is weaker, 
but still significant at the 1 % level. The correlations between current returns Rt and future earnings 
change for t+2 and t+3 (Xt+2 and Xt+3) are not significant. These results may provide evidence of 
prices leading earnings by only one period. Current return is also correlated with future returns of 
period t+1 while Rt is uncorrelated with Rt+2 and Rt+3. Future  returns  (Rt+1, Rt+2 and Rt+3)  are 
significantly  correlated  with  future earnings growth (Xt+1, Xt+2 and Xt+3), consistent  with  Collins  
et  al.  (1994). These  correlations  indicate  that  future  returns  should  not influence the results 
except through their role as a  proxy for the measurement error in future earnings. We notice a 
significant and negative correlation between current earnings (Xt) and future earnings growth for 3 
periods of analysis. Similarly, Xt+1 is significantly and negatively related to Xt+2 and Xt+3. This may 
suggest potential multicollinearity problems within the independent variables. The variable inflation 
factor (VIF) did not raise a serious collinearity problem among the explanatory variables. The mean  
VIF  is  about   1.12 and  the  computed  VIF  for  each  predictor  variable is  largely under 5. AG t 
and Ept-1 seem to be also good error measurement proxies. The theory indicates that an errors-in-
variables proxy should be highly correlated with the measurement error but uncorrelated with the 
dependent variable.  
Insert Table 4 About Here 
This is the case for these two control variables. As reported in Table 3, the correlation 
coefficients between Rt on the one hand and AGt as well as Ept-1 on the other hand are insignificant. 
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Risk disclosure level is positively and significantly associated with current stock returns at the level 
of 10%. This may suggest that corporate risk disclosure activity in MENA emerging markets is 
induced by stock price performance. Lundholm and Myers (2002) find in the same way a positive 
and significant correlation between current returns and the disclosure score. 
With respect to board characteristics, pairwise testing in Table 3 shows that board size (BS) is 
positively related to the earnings of period t-1.  In contrast, there is negative correlation between BS 
and current and future earnings growth for t+2’s period at the levels of 5%. These univariate results 
may indicate that the larger is corporate board size the smaller is firms’ current and future earnings 
changes. Board size seems to be likewise negatively associated with the amount of non-executive 
directors sitting on the board. This shows that large sized board in our sample includes a low amount 
of non-executive directors. Non-executive directors (NED) are positively associated with the future 
returns for t+2’s period, though it is negatively correlated with future earnings growth for the same 
period. This suggests that firms with high proportion of independent members on board have higher 
future returns despite the lower earnings growth for t+2. In contrast, firms with high number of 
independent directors have more important future earnings change for t+3. As for the 
CEO/Chairman role duality, it is negatively correlated with future returns (Rt+1, Rt+3) and the 
proportion of NED showing that firms with role duality exhibit lower stock performance  and 
involve less proportion of outside directors. 
Table 4 also presents Pearson correlations for all regression variables using pooled data across 
the three year sample period. The earnings per share measure is a Reuters’ fundamental item, 
calculated by dividing ‘earnings for ordinary-full tax’ by the number of shares outstanding. Xt, Xt+1, 
Xt+2 and Xt+3 are defined as earnings change deflated by price. Both current and future earnings 
changes are deflated by the price at the start of the return window for period t.  Rt, Rt+1, Rt+2 and Rt+3 
are calculated as buy-and-hold returns (inclusive of dividends) over a 12-month period, starting six 
months after the end of the previous financial year. EPt–1 is defined as period t–1’s earnings over 
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price six months after the financial year-end of period t–1. AGt is the growth rate of the total book 
value of assets for period t. RD is the natural logarithm of the total number of risk related sentences. 
BS is the number of directors sitting on the board at the end of each year. NED is the proportion of 
non-executive directors relative to the Board size. Dual is defined as 1 if CEO is the Chairman and 
0 otherwise. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
We basically address three corporate board characteristics. We hypothesized that the amount of 
non-executive directors, board size and the CEO/Chairman duality may impact (increase/decrease) 
the informativeness of risk disclosure with respect to future earnings. We provide coefficients 
estimates based on pooled OLS regression. 
Board Size and Informativeness of Voluntary Risk Disclosure 
Table 5 presents OLS regression results for pooled data. The dependent variable is current 
period return, Rt. Rt, Rt+1, Rt+2 and Rt+3 are calculated as buy-and-hold returns (inclusive of dividends) 
over a 12-month period, starting six months after the end of the previous financial year. Xt, Xt+1, Xt+2 
and Xt+3 are defined as earnings change deflated by price. Both current and future earnings changes 
are deflated by the price at the start of the return window for period t.  EPt–1 is defined as period t–
1’s earnings over price six months after the financial year-end of period t–1. AGt is the growth rate 
of the total book value of assets for period t. RD is the natural logarithm of the total number of risk 
related sentences. BS is the number of directors sitting on the board at the end of each year. Financial 
leverage, firm size and profitability are control variables (their regression estimates are not 
tabulated).  
Insert Table 5 About Here 
Table 5 provides multiple regression estimates for our first hypothesis which examine the effect 
of board size on risk disclosure informativeness. The coefficients on RD*∑ Xt+k3k=1  exhibit a negative 
sign and are mostly insignificant except for the interaction term RD*Xt+3 which are significantly 
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different from zero at the levels of 5% and 1%. These findings indicate that risk information which 
are not driven by the number of board directors appear to reduce the share price forecast of future 
earnings. 
Estimates of primary interest are given by the coefficients on the interaction terms 
BS*RD*∑  Xt+k3k=1 . Consistent with our prior expectation, results revealed a positive effect of risk 
disclosure driven by board size on the market’s forecast of future earnings growth for three years 
ahead. Such results indicate that firms with large board size are more likely to disclose significantly 
useful voluntary information about corporate opportunities and risks. Investors seem to trust risk 
information conveyed by firms with a large board size as it reflects a diverse expertise and it may 
guarantee a higher level of compliance with the accountability paradigm. These findings, therefore, 
support our first hypothesis and suggest that investors place weight on risk disclosure of better-
governed companies within the scrutinized context.  Actually, most companies of the MENA region 
follow the Anglo-Saxon model of one tier board structure. Their boards’ size is generally between 
seven and eleven with some cases where boards can reach 17 or even more. This relatively wide 
structure seems to drive investors’ reliance on risk disclosure in assessing corporate future prospects, 
especially that ownership concentration is the absolute norm within the region. As executive 
directors and non-executive directors operate together in one organizational layer, conflicts of 
interest are likely to be reduced and investors seem to consider their monitoring activity as efficient. 
It is worth mentioning that our results are consistent with Wang and Hussainey (2013) who showed 
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that large board size is associated with more informative disclosure about future earnings in 
corporate annual reports.  
On the contrary, they are inconsistent with Ferrreira et al. (2011) and Yu (2011) who did not 
find evidence that stock prices are more informative about future earnings growth in firms with a 
large board size.  
Non-Executive Directors and Informativeness of Voluntary Risk Disclosure 
Table 6 presents OLS regression results for pooled data. The dependent variable is current 
period return, Rt. Rt, Rt+1, Rt+2 and Rt+3 are calculated as buy-and-hold returns (inclusive of dividends) 
over a 12-month period, starting six months after the end of the previous financial year. Xt, Xt+1, Xt+2 
and Xt+3 are defined as earnings change deflated by price. Both current and future earnings changes 
are deflated by the price at the start of the return window for period t.  EPt–1 is defined as period t–
1’s earnings over price six months after the financial year-end of period t–1. AGt is the growth rate 
of the total book value of assets for period t. RD is the natural logarithm of the total number of risk 
related sentences. NED is the proportion of non-executive directors relative to the board size. 
Financial leverage, firm size and profitability are control variables (their regression estimates are 
not tabulated).  
Insert Table 6 About Here 
Table 6 covers main regression findings for our second hypothesis regarding estimates of the 
impact of the proportion of non-executive directors sitting on the board and the informativeness of 
risk disclosure. Risk disclosure does not seem to be informative about future earnings. The 
coefficients on the interaction terms RD*∑  Xt+k3k=1  are, though positive (except for RD*Xt+1), 
insignificant. The coefficient on RD*Rt+1 is positive and significant at the levels of 10% and 5%, 
mainly when controlling for financial leverage and firm size. The partial F-test of the joint 
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significance of RD*Xt+1 and RD*Rt+1 is only significant in the specification model that controls for 
corporate size at the level of 10%.  
The coefficients of interest are NED*RD*∑  Xt+k3k=1  . These terms emphasize how the amount 
of non-executive directors influences the informativeness of voluntary risk information. In support 
of our second hypothesis, the coefficients on the interaction term NED*RD*Xt+1 are significantly 
positive at the levels of 1% and 5%. Our findings suggest that outside directors sitting on the board 
enhance the value relevance of risk disclosure.  Their interactions impact positively risk disclosure 
informativeness about future earnings for one year ahead.  There is no evidence of such impact for 
t+2 and t+3 periods. Accordingly, a high number of non-executive directors provides investors with 
assurance over annual report narratives. They are believed to be more influential in terms of the 
board decision making and particularly in enhancing the quality of corporate voluntary disclosure. 
Risk reporting is considered hence as a credible source of information for investors to predict future 
earnings growth. These findings highlight that risk disclosure informativeness is somehow the 
outcome of the recent corporate governance reforms within the region despite the soft approaches 
to their enforcement. Our sample firms seem to comply with the existing codes which have been 
focusing on the promotion of a majority of non-executive directors’ structure in boards. This had 
favorable implications on the performance of boards and their willingness to issue informative risk 
disclosures voluntarily. It is noteworthy that our results are consistent with Wang and Hussainey 
(2013). They showed that higher proportions of non-executive directors are more likely to disclose 
relevant information related to future earnings, suggesting that greater financial reporting expertise 
exists on such boards.  
Our findings are inconsistent with Yu (2011) who indicates that the information about expected 
future earnings does not appear to be effectively incorporated into the stock price for firms with 
optimal board structure (e.g. Board independence, board size, role duality). The insignificant 
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association suggests that the quality of the board is a form of internal oversight that does not urge 
managers to offer information on a voluntary basis. 
CEO/Chairman Duality and Informativeness of Risk Disclosure 
Table 7 also presents OLS regression results for pooled data. The dependent variable is current 
period return, Rt. Rt, Rt+1, Rt+2 and Rt+3 are calculated as buy-and-hold returns (inclusive of dividends) 
over a 12-month period, starting six months after the end of the previous financial year. Xt, Xt+1, Xt+2 
and Xt+3 are defined as earnings change deflated by price. Both current and future earnings changes 
are deflated by the price at the start of the return window for period t.  EPt–1 is defined as period t–
1’s earnings over price six months after the financial year-end of period t–1. AGt is the growth rate 
of the total book value of assets for period t. RD is the natural logarithm of the total number of risk 
related sentences. Dual is a dummy variable defined as 1 if CEO is the Chairman and 0 otherwise. 
Financial leverage, firm size and profitability are control variables (their regression estimates are 
not tabulated). 
Insert Table 7 About Here 
Table 7 summarizes main findings regarding our third hypothesis testing. We predicted a 
weaker impact of CEO/Chairman duality on voluntary risk disclosure informativeness. There is 
evidence on risk disclosure informativeness with respect to future earnings of period t+1 given the 
significant coefficients on RD*Xt+1. The coefficients on the interaction term RD*Rt+3 are likewise 
positive and significant at the levels of 5% and 10%. The joint significance test for the slope 
coefficients on RD*Xt+3 and RD*Rt+3 yielded also a significant F statistic at the level of 5%. These 
findings suggest that risk reporting activity which is not related to the presence of the 
CEO/chairperson duality is informative about future earnings growth. 
The incremental impact of the role duality on the informativeness of risk disclosure is given by 
the coefficients on interacted variables DUAL*RD*∑ Xt+K3K=1 . Findings rejected our third 
hypothesis in that the coefficients of the interaction terms are insignificant in all the specifications 
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even though they exhibit the predicted sign. There is hence no evidence that risk disclosure driven 
by role duality is less informative about future earnings. Risk reporting related to role duality 
impacts negatively the credibility of current earnings at the level of 1%. Firms with the same person 
occupying the roles of chairman and CEO have then significant credibility problems with their 
financial reports and in particular with information about corporate risk. The stock market places 
lower credibility on such information, presumably because the CEO/chairperson is likely to 
compromise the board independence and to seek private interests. Thereby, this situation can lead 
to conflicts of interest that encompass the accounting system and the voluntary release of useful 
information. Our results are in line with Yu (2011) findings, which indicate that there is no effect of 
the board leadership structure (as examined through board quality index) on the earnings’ 
information content of stock prices. They are also consistent with some recent voluntary and risk 
disclosure literature such as Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Elshandidy et al (2013), Elzahar and 
Hussainey (2012) and Mokhtar and Mellet (2013) which did not find evidence that role duality is a 
potential threat to disclosure quality. These results in turn support neither the agency theory nor the 
signaling theory. 
Robustness Checks 
Endogenous Nature of Corporate Governance Choice  
and Informativeness of Risk Information 
Recent academic research addressed an important question of whether good corporate 
governance has a first order effect on some outcome variables (e.g. firm performance, firm 
valuation, financial reporting quality, share price informativeness). According to Beyer et al. (2010), 
given the endogenous nature of the corporate information environment, corporate governance, and 
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some observed outcomes, it is hard to recognize the exact impact that one mechanism would have 
on another one.  
Our main concern arises from the potential endogeneity problem between risk disclosure 
informativeness and firm-level governance structure. The causality might run from risk disclosure 
informativeness to corporate governance improvement. Moreover, other omitted firm characteristics 
could impact both voluntary risk disclosure informativeness and corporate governance. For 
example, Durnev et al. (2004) suggest that information conveyed by share prices can affect firm 
governance mechanisms as it signals to the capital markets on the need to react when management 
decisions are inadequate. More informative disclosure can serve as a disciplining means in that it 
enhances external monitoring mechanisms (shareholder lawsuits, institutional investor pressure and 
the market for corporate control) as well as the internal monitoring role of the board (Ferreira et al. 
2011). If governance structure regressors are inferred to be endogenously determined, failure to 
incorporate exogenous determinants of the association between share price informativeness and 
corporate governance choices will result in correlated omitted variables problem. Standard OLS 
regression will provide inconsistent parameters due to the correlated omitted variables’ problem. 
The common econometric solution to endogeneity issue is the use of instrumental variables’ 
specification procedure. Instrumental variables should be associated with endogenous regressors but 
unrelated to the error term in the structural equation (Habib and Azim 2008). Larker et al (2007) 
argue that while this approach is theoretically strong, in practice, it is difficult to find an instrumental 
variable that is correlated with assignment to treatment level but not the outcome. Larcker and 
Rusticus (2010) showed that OLS estimates provide better parameter estimates than two-stage least 
square approach if the chosen instrumental variables do not conform to the standard definition of 
instrumental variables.  
The selection of adequate instruments in our study is challenging because we use multiple 
endogenous variables as measures of corporate governance, that is, board size, board composition 
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and role duality. In addition, since our board structure data have mostly no time variation, there is 
no appropriate way to address the issue of causality directly. To address the potential endogeneity 
is our study, we follow the Larcker and Rusticus (2010) and Frank (2000) alternative approach. 
Their method involves assessing how large the endogeneity issue (unmodeled variable) has to be to 
change the OLS coefficient estimates and, in particular, how large it has to be to make the 
coefficients statistically insignificant. Unlike the instrumental variable approach that is meant to 
reduce bias in the coefficient estimates, Frank (2000) and Frank et al. (2008) method is used to 
assess the sensitivity of a coefficient and its standard error to the inclusion of a confounding variable. 
They specified a minimum threshold necessary for an omitted confounding variable to invalidate 
the significant results of a variable of interest in an ordinary least square regression model. Frank 
(2000) offered an improvement over previous applications of sensitivity analysis. He suggests that 
for a confounding variable to impact the statistical inference, it should be correlated with both the 
independent variable and the dependent variable (controlling for the other variables).  
For the purpose of our sensitivity test, we calculate the impact of the confounding variables on 
the significant coefficients of two endogenous independent variables with respect board 
characteristics (BS and NED). While, by definition, we do not have access to the unobserved and 
unmodeled variable, we do have other control variables: financial leverage ratio, firm size and 
profitability. We are able, therefore, to calculate the impact of the inclusion of each control variable 
on the significant coefficient on the interaction terms NED*RD*Xt+1 and BS*RD*Xt+3. Likewise, 
the impact of each control variable is the product of the partial correlation between the endogenous 
board characteristics’ measures and the control variables and the correlation between the dependent 
variable (Rt) and the control variable (taking out partially the effects of the other control variables). 
Frank et al. (2013) suggest that for a valid inference, the impact of a confounding variable should 
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not exceed the estimated impact threshold (ITCV), otherwise the coefficients on the explanatory 
endogenous variables would be considered as fragile.  
Table 8 reports the results of our sensitivity analysis. The threshold value of the proportion of 
non-executive directors is 0.0364. This suggests that the correlation between the dependent variable 
(Rt) and the endogenous independent variable (NED*RD*Xt+1) with the unobserved confounding 
variable each only need to be about 0.190 (√0.0364 ) for the OLS result to be overturned. Given 
that our control variables are interacted with predictors in the augmented Collins et al (1994) 
regression of current returns on future earnings, we follow Frank (2000) approach in addressing the 
specific case of multiple confounds. Frank (2000) used the square root of the multiple correlation 
between x and cv (r (x.cv)) and the square root of the multiple correlation between y and cv (r (y⋅cv)) 
to assess the impact of confounding variables. It is worth noting that in our case r (y⋅cv) and r (x.cv) 
are the r2 statistics from the regressions of current returns and the predictor of interest on controlling 
variables.5 Firm size (0.21) and corporate profitability (0.175) have the largest impact on our 
regression coefficients.  Indeed, the impact of financial leverage, firm size and corporate 
profitability are respectively 58 percent, 476 percent and 382 percent of the ITCV for the interacted 
variable NED*RD*Xt+1. These results suggest that these control variables are important covariates 
to be included in the model, although comparable covariates, in and of themselves, would not alter 
the inference with regard to the variable of interest. Accordingly, our statistic inference with respect 
to the joint effect of the proportion of non-executive directors and risk disclosure on share price 
anticipation of future earnings is robust to the problem of omitted variable.  
Insert Table 8 About Here 
The threshold single value for Board size (BS) is about 0.0345 suggesting each of the relevant 
correlations needs to be about 0.185 (√0.0345 ) for the OLS result to be overturned. Similarly, firm 
size (0.227) and profitability (0.167) exhibit the largest impact on our OLS regression coefficients. 
Moreover, the impact of financial leverage, firm size and corporate profitability are 135 percent, 
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558 percent and 386 percent respectively of the ITCV for the interacted predictor BS*RD*Xt+3. 
These control variables are therefore important covariates and have to be included in the model, 
although comparable covariates, in and of themselves, would not alter the inference with regard to 
the variable of interest.  Accordingly, our statistic inference with respect to the joint effect of the 
board size and risk disclosure on share price anticipation of future earnings is robust to the problem 
of unmodeled variables.  
These findings cleared, then the concern with regard to causal inference in our pooled OLS 
regression and confirmed that the estimated coefficients are valid as we controlled for the observed 
strong covariate.  
For the two endogenous independent variables, an impact statistic is calculated (ITCV) 
indicating the minimum impact of an unobserved variable that is needed to render the coefficient 
statistically insignificant. The ITCV is defined as the product of the correlation between the 
endogenous independent variables (BC1 and BC2) and the unmodeled variable and the correlation 
between the dependent variable (current stock returns) and the control variables (partialling out the 
effect of the other control variables). The sign of the impact measure indicates how the inclusion of 
the control variable affects the coefficient for the endogenous independent variables (BC1 and BC2) 
respectively. The impact results also help in assessing the likelihood that such an unmodeled 
variable exists. The sign of the impact score indicates how the inclusion of each control variable 
affects the coefficient of each endogenous independent variable. A positive impact score indicates 
that inclusion of the control variables makes the coefficient on the endogenous independent variable 
more positive or less negative. A negative impact score has the opposite effect. Impact/ITCV is the 
reliability of the control variable.  
CONCLUSION 
This study aims to test whether boards’ structure influences the informativeness of narrative 
risk disclosure in annual reports for a sample of MENA emerging markets. We define the 
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informativeness of risk disclosure as the extent to which voluntary risk information improves the 
amount of future earnings news impounded into share prices. Our main hypotheses predict that risk 
disclosures’ informativeness might be positively influenced by the size and the composition of the 
board of directors and negatively impacted by role duality. Our empirical findings are based on large 
samples of annual reports electronically available for roughly 320 non-financial firms listed in nine 
MENA emerging markets. We generate our estimates from a pooled OLS regression whereby we 
control for the cross-sectional effects of some determinants of voluntary disclosure as well as the 
earnings response coefficients such as financial leverage, firm size, profitability and industry sector.  
We find that good board structure (large size and high proportion of non-executive directors) 
enhances risk disclosure informativeness about future earnings. Investors believe that board 
diversity increases members’ expertise, eliminates environmental uncertainties and enhances the 
richness of information environment. Market participants also think that non-executive directors can 
restrain the managerial self-serving behavior and ensure useful risk reporting in anticipating future 
earnings growth. Regarding board leadership, role duality does not impact risk disclosure 
informativeness with respect to future earnings. Investors tend to question the credibility of 
voluntary risk information and perceive current earnings as less value relevant for firms 
characterized by the presence of a dominant person. 
Although this study is one of the pioneering researches that investigate the impact of boards’ 
structure on the informativeness of risk disclosure, it still suffers from some caveats. Given that the  
corporate  governance  definition  of  good  best  practices  is  still  ambiguous and unresolved 
(Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010), the internal governance measures might suffer from 
measurement bias. As risk reporting is still a fertile area not only for empirical but also for 
conceptual and analytical research, we think that there are other dependent variables that could be 
investigated in future research. In particular, internal audit environment (audit committee 
composition, meeting frequency, etc.…), corporate ownership structure and the presence of 
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litigation costs may also have differing effects on the perceived relevance of risk disclosure. Finally, 
cross-country differences in risk reporting informativeness within MENA emerging markets are 
uncovered by this study. Future research may fill this gap and empirically examine some country-
level governance factors that explain these differences. 
  
Board Structure and Informativeness of Risk Disclosure 
 39 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Risk Disclosure Categories Adopted From 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) 
 
Risk Disclosure Category/Items 
Operations Risk 
Customer Satisfaction 
Product Development 
Efficiency And Performance 
Sourcing 
Stock Obsolescence And Shrinkage 
Product And Service Failure 
Environmental 
Health And Safety 
Brand Name Erosion 
Empowerment Risk 
Leadership And Management 
Outsourcing 
Performance Incentives 
Change Readiness 
Communications 
Information Processing And Technology Risk  
Integrity 
Access 
Availability 
Infrastructure 
Integrity Risk 
Management And Employee Fraud 
Illegal Acts 
Reputation 
Strategic Risk 
Environmental Scan 
Industry 
Business Portfolio 
Competitors 
Pricing 
Valuation 
Planning 
Life Cycle 
Performance Measurement 
Regulatory 
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NOTES 
1. Recent surveys (OECD, 2014; 2012) highlighted that the MENA region lacks best 
corporate governance practices compared to the OECD’s governance principles and to the 
implemented mechanisms in developed countries.  
2. We decided to focus on the emerging markets in the MENA region since it is argued that 
investors’ pressure and demand for additional corporate disclosure are positively related to the level 
of capital market development. Financial markets are one of the key factors in a country’s economic 
development given their critical roles in the process of mobilizing savings, funding investment 
opportunities and optimal resource allocation among the different economic sectors. 
3. Israel is the only country in the region that follows the common law legal system. 
4. An advantage of the manual approach over a computer-aided content analysis is that, 
though time consuming, it enables the differentiation between voluntary and mandatory statements, 
the identification of topics or themes associated with voluntary risk disclosures and their scoring 
separately. Annual reports are available in Arabic, French or English language depending on which 
country the sample firms are listed. 
5. In comparing the ITCV to the distribution of impact scores for the control variables, we 
implicitly assume that the confounding variable is similarly correlated with the other control 
variables. 
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Panel B: Stocks Traded Total Value (% of GDP)  
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Bahrain 7.48 11.50 3.73 1.11 0.95 1.002 
Egypt 40.68 42.77 27.94 16.95 9.31 7.67 
Israel 64.21 51.02 42.75 57.26 40.83 26.18 
Jordan 101.85 127.46 57.28 35.74 13.94 9.011 
Kuwait 105.29 83.28 66.03 36.22 13.89 13.21 
KSA 163.43 100.94 78.53 38.57 43.76 70.09 
Morocco 34.93 24.67 32.35 11.84 6.37 3.65 
Oman 12.90 13.79 12.05 5.83 3.79 3.46 
Qatar 37.53 41.82 26.08 14.63 13.62 8.06 
Tunisia 1.67 3.33 2.89 3.82 2.43 2.76 
Turkey 46.72 32.82 39.62 57.65 53.39 44.17 
UAE 58.29 45.92 25.91 9.59 4.55 4.73 
Panel C: Number of Domestic Listed Companies 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Bahrain 43 45 49 44 44 43 
Egypt 435 373 305 213 231 234 
Israel 654 642 622 613 576 532 
Jordan 245 262 272 277 247 243 
Kuwait 181 202 207 215 206 189 
KSA 111 127 135 146 150 158 
Morocco 74 77 78 73 75 76 
Oman 120 122 120 119 123 124 
Qatar 40 42 48 43 42 42 
Tunisia 50 49 52 56 57 59 
Turkey 319 317 315 337 362 405 
UAE 90 96 95 101 104 102 
Source:  WDI, the World Bank, 2012 
  
Table 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics for MENA Emerging Market Firms 
 
Panel A: Market Capitalisation of Listed Companies (% of GDP) 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Bahrain 129.46 82.36 73.82 79.45 59.05 52.23 
Egypt 106.75 52.74 47.59 37.68 20.62 22.07 
Israel 133.78 62.85 88.19 93.62 56.10 57.71 
Jordan 240.88 163.14 133.78 116.79 94.25 87.26 
Kuwait 164.03 72.71 90.58 103.64 65.48 55.78 
KSA 123.83 47.39 74.28 67.08 50.61 50.87 
Morocco 100.36 73.97 69.20 76.18 60.56 54.88 
Oman 54.79 24.48 35.75 34.56 29.02 26.33 
Qatar 119.79 66.19 89.83 98.77 73.85 66.53 
Tunisia 13.76 14.20 20.98 24.04 21.02 19.64 
Turkey 44.28 16.14 36.73 41.94 26.04 39.14 
UAE 46.95 21.81 31.63 26.94 20.52 18.25 
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Table 2 
 
Sample Composition by Country 
 
Country Observations 
Egypt 66 
Jordan 124 
Kuwait 58 
Morocco 48 
Oman 143 
Saudi Arabia 86 
Tunisia 53 
Turkey 145 
UAE   66 
Total 789 
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Table 3 
 
Summary Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel A: Continuous Variables (Pooled Data for N = 789) 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Rt 0.030 0.527 -0.921 -0.342 -0.047 0.312 1.815 
Xt 0.009 0.111 -0.310 -0.016 0.002 0.025 0.659 
Xt+1 0.004 0.114 -0.521 -0.018 0.000 0.021 0.566 
Xt+2 0.005 0.103 -0.441 -0.016 0.000 0.022 0.507 
Xt+3 0.006 0.086 -0.401 -0.010 0 0.018 0.426 
Rt+1 0.062 0.609 -0.943 -0.329 -0.061 0.299 0.878 
Rt+2 0.154 0.565 -0.860 -0.171 0.024 0.304 0.851 
Rt+3 0.084 0.474 -0.816 -0.181 0 0.252 0.558 
AGt 0. 122 0.173 -0.090 -0.014 0.081 0.223 0.470 
Ept-1 0.90 1.374 -0.01 0.04 0.19 1.08 4.17 
RD  27.343 21.255 1 13 22 35 145 
BS 8.209 2.426 2 7 8 9 23 
NED 68.108 23.643 0 50 70 87.5 100 
Lev 52.412 76.679 -0.078 3.753 25.673 70.857 456.497 
Size (M$) 658.017 1,936.599 5.48 21.75 117.015 422.37 25,101.77 
Profit 26.792 151.942     0.05 7.25 14.44 25.59 98.729 
Panel B: Dummy Variable (Longitudinal Data for N =789) 
Variable Frequency Percent Cum.  
DUAL  
0 554 70.22 70.22  
1 235 29.78 100.00  
Dual is defined as 1 if CEO is the Chairman and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4 
 
Pearson Correlations (Pooled Data) 
 
Variable Rt Xt Xt+1 Xt+2 Xt+3 Rt+1 Rt+2 Rt+ 3 EPt–1 AGt RD BS NED Dual 
Rt 1.000              
Xt 
p-value 
0.134*** 
0.000 
1.000             
Xt+1 
p-value 
0.097*** 
0.006 
-0.287*** 
0.000 
1.000            
Xt+2 
p-value 
0.008 
0.820 
0.017 
0.632 
-0.203*** 
0.000 
1.000           
Xt+3 
p-value 
-0.018 
0.603 
-0.105*** 
0.003 
-0.058* 
0.098 
-0.219*** 
0.000 
1.000          
Rt+1 
p-value 
-0.223*** 
0.000 
-0.019 
0.586 
0.195*** 
0.000 
0.111*** 
0.001 
-0.099*** 
0.005 
1.000         
Rt+2 
p-value 
0.010 
0.776 
0.071** 
0.045 
-0.014 
0.687 
0.083** 
0.019 
0.056 
0.114 
-0.150*** 
0.000 
1.000        
Rt+3 
p-value 
0.014 
0.682 
0.036 
0.305 
-0.026 
0.461 
0.141*** 
0.000 
-0.019 
0.576 
0.032 
0.368 
0.037 
0.289 
1.000       
EPt–1 
p-value 
-0.017 
0.618 
-0.036 
0.306 
-0.012 
0.730 
-0.036 
0.300 
-0.021 
0.548 
-0.038 
0.279 
-0.052 
0.138 
-0.085** 
0.016 
1.000      
AGt 
p-value 
-0.036 
0.312 
0.007 
0.839 
0.006 
0.866 
0.041 
0.247 
-0.007 
0.833 
-0.000 
0.979 
0.061* 
0.086 
-0.012 
0.731 
-0.013 
0.709 
1.000     
RD 
p-value 
0.064* 
0.071 
-0.003 
0.922 
-0.005 
0.869 
0.021 
0.543 
0.003 
0.920 
0.078** 
0.028 
-0.083** 
0.018 
0.003 
0.931 
0.144*** 
0.000 
-0.024 
0.488 
1.000    
BS 
p-value 
-0.030 
0.385 
-0.086** 
0.015 
-0.051 
0.151 
-0.071** 
0.044 
-0.023 
0.519 
-0.082* 
0.020 
-0.098*** 
0.005 
-0.019 
0.585 
0.182*** 
0.000 
-0.047 
0.178 
0.050 
0.156 
1.000   
NED 
p-value 
0.041 
0.241 
0.026 
0.465 
0.028 
0.433 
-0.069* 
0.051 
0.102*** 
0.003 
0.056 
0.111 
0.061* 
0.083 
0.026 
0.449 
-0.122*** 
0.000 
-0.024 
0.498 
-0.010 
0.762 
-0.136*** 
0.000 
1.000  
Dual 
p-value 
0.015 
0.672 
-0.031 
0.372 
0.025 
0.476 
0.007 
0.837 
-0.033 
0.346 
-0.074** 
0.037 
-0.045 
0.203 
-0.070** 
0.047 
0.187*** 
0.000 
-0.010 
0.765 
-0.009 
0.794 
0.014 
0.680 
-0.274*** 
0.000 
1.000 
*, **, *** significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 5 
 
Effect of Board Size on Informativeness of Voluntary Risk Disclosure 
(N = 789) 
 
  Financial   
 Exp. Leverage Firm Size Profitability 
Variable Sign Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value 
Intercept (?)  -0.093 0.373 -0.088 0.398  -0.154 0.160 
Xt (+)  -4.297 0.260 -4.892 0.191  -6.449* 0.096 
Xt+1 (+)   5.231 0.200  4.270 0.292   7.549* 0.072 
Xt+2 (+)   3.750 0.351  4.350 0.275   5.209 0.193 
Xt+3 (+) 10.780** 0.013  9.423** 0.032  13.063*** 0.004 
Rt+1 (–)   0.128 0.806  0.162 0.755   0.078 0.881 
Rt+2 (–)  -0.543 0.223 -0.404 0.368  -0.889* 0.065 
Rt+3 (–)   0.104 0.877 -0.083 0.901   0.179 0.791 
AGt (–)  -0.130 0.321 -0.057 0.655  -0.021 0.86 
Ept-1 (+)   0.032 0.383  0.027 0.462   0.038 0.291 
RD (?)   0.081*** 0.001  0.079*** 0.002   0.071*** 0.005 
RD*Xt (?)   1.837 0.119  1.952* 0.090   2.430** 0.037 
RD*Xt+1 (+)  -1.266 0.339 -1.106 0.404  -1.717 0.207 
RD*Xt+2 (+)  -1.185 0.362 -1.620 0.211  -1.611 0.213 
RD*Xt+3 (+)  -3.475** 0.015 -3.106** 0.032  -3.941*** 0.007 
RD*Rt+1 (?)  -0.143 0.375 -0.128 0.424  -0.131 0.413 
RD*Rt+2 (?)   0.123 0.408  0.132 0.373   0.200 0.183 
RD*Rt+3 (?)  -0.047 0.824 -0.009 0.966  -0.057 0.789 
RD*AGt (?)   0.047 0.348  0.025 0.606   0.010 0.825 
RD*Ept-1 (?)  -0.008 0.356 -0.007 0.430  -0.010 0.285 
BS (?)  -0.014* 0.096 -0.014 0.102  -0.013 0.110 
BS*Xt (?)   0.274 0.538  0.304 0.485   0.573 0.197 
BS*Xt+1 (?)  -0.802 0.117 -0.681 0.179  -0.965* 0.063 
BS*Xt+2 (?)  -0.494 0.326 -0.564 0.257  -0.619 0.214 
BS*Xt+3 (?)  -1.451*** 0.006 -1.297** 0.015  -1.662*** 0.002 
BS*Rt+1 (?)  -0.043 0.482 -0.044 0.467  -0.039 0.519 
BS*Rt+2 (?)   0.101* 0.088  0.091 0.125   0.134** 0.029 
BS*Rt+3 (?)  -0.040 0.612 -0.020 0.791  -0.038 0.628 
BS*AGt (?)   0.019 0.271  0.014 0.393   0.007 0.651 
BS*Ept-1 (?)  -0.002 0.413 -0.001 0.511  -0.002 0.309 
BS*RD*Xt (?)  -0.106 0.434 -0.126 0.340  -0.183 0.171 
BS*RD*Xt+1 (+)   0.244 0.142  0.216 0.194   0.289* 0.091 
BS*RD*Xt+2 (+)   0.174 0.282  0.198 0.216   0.226 0.160 
BS*RD*Xt+3 (+)   0.480*** 0.006  0.440** 0.012   0.534*** 0.002 
BS*RD*Rt+1 (?)   0.017 0.355  0.017 0.366   0.016 0.399 
BS*RD*Rt+2 (?)  -0.027 0.166 -0.024 0.220  -0.038* 0.056 
BS*RD*Rt+3 (?)   0.016 0.523  0.009 0.694   0.014 0.568 
BS*RD*AGt (?)  -0.007 0.302 -0.005 0.391  -0.003 0.641 
BS*RD*EPt-1 (?)   0.000 0.404  0.000 0.478   0.000 0.288 
Adj R2  9.89% 10.11% 10.90% 
*, **, *** significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 6 
 
Effect of Non-Executive Directors on Informativeness of Risk Disclosure 
(N = 789) 
 
  Financial   
 Exp. Leverage Firm Size Profitability 
Variable Sign Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value 
Intercept (?) -0.278*** 0.004 -0.285*** 0.004 -0.323*** 0.001 
Xt (+) -1.309 0.153 -1.187 0.199 -1.308 0.156 
Xt+1 (+)  0.888 0.315  0.633 0.473  0.543 0.558 
Xt+2 (+)  0.119 0.899  0.127 0.891  0.196 0.832 
Xt+3 (+) -0.741 0.482 -0.363 0.729 -0.527 0.618 
Rt+1 (–) -0.381** 0.023 -0.404** 0.016 -0.386** 0.022 
Rt+2 (–)  0.320* 0.061  0.242 0.153  0.217 0.202 
Rt+3 (–) -0.017 0.952 -0.123 0.543 -0.020 0.927 
AGt (–)  0.067 0.112  0.034 0.465  0.062 0.129 
Ept-1 (+)  0.007 0.289  0.005 0.532  0.005 0.498 
RD (?)  0.066*** 0.006  0.070*** 0.004  0.064*** 0.008 
RD*Xt (?)  0.355 0.340  0.091 0.814  0.440 0.279 
RD*Xt+1 (+) -0.287 0.407 -0.471 0.202 -0.128 0.731 
RD*Xt+2 (+)  0.424 0.219  0.189 0.607  0.411 0.247 
RD*Xt+3 (+)  0.470 0.258  0.294 0.513  0.447 0.291 
RD*Rt+1 (?)  0.097* 0.094  0.137** 0.027  0.102 0.105 
RD*Rt+2 (?) -0.087 0.166 -0.026 0.685 -0.104 0.117 
RD*Rt+3 (?)  0.031 0.754  0.025 0.757  0.022 0.793 
RD*AGt (?) -0.027 0.150 -0.014 0.409 -0.034 0.173 
RD*Ept-1 (?) -0.001 0.386 -0.001 0.561 -0.000 0.667 
NED (?)  0.001* 0.051  0.001** 0.046  0.001** 0.047 
NED*Xt (?)  0.001 0.765 -0.008* 0.069  0.003 0.502 
NED*Xt+1 (?) -0.010*** 0.000 -0.011*** 0.000 -0.006 0.207 
NED*Xt+2 (?) -0.003 0.346 -0.004 0.134 -0.003 0.433 
NED*Xt+3 (?) -0.001 0.651 -0.003 0.244  0.000 0.944 
NED*Rt+1 (?)  0.001 0.140  0.002* 0.070  0.001 0.158 
NED*Rt+2 (?) -0.002 0.104 -0.000 0.558 -0.003* 0.051 
NED*Rt+3 (?) -0.003 0.328 -0.002 0.186 -0.003 0.157 
NED*AGt (?) -0.000 0.146 -0.000 0.462 -0.000 0.354 
NED*Ept-1 (?) -0.000 0.518  0.000 0.651  0.000 0.448 
NED*RD*Xt (?)  0.005* 0.066  0.008*** 0.008  0.004 0.191 
NED*RD*Xt+1 (+)  0.009*** 0.002  0.010*** 0.001  0.007** 0.029 
NED*RD*Xt+2 (+) -0.004 0.168 -0.003 0.316 -0.004 0.161 
NED*RD*Xt+3 (+) -0.000 0.821  0.000 0.853 -0.001 0.747 
NED*RD*Rt+1 (?) -0.001** 0.024 -0.001*** 0.009 -0.001** 0.040 
NED*RD*Rt+2 (?)  0.000 0.608 -0.000 0.892  0.000 0.372 
NED*RD*Rt+3 (?)  0.000 0.521  0.000 0.403  0.000 0.409 
NED*RD*AGt (?)  0.000 0.342  0.000 0.689  0.000 0.360 
NED*RD*EPt-1 (?)  0.000 0.909 -0.000 0.593 -0.000 0.476 
Adj R2  12.72% 12.49% 12.12% 
*, **, *** significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 7 
 
Effect of Role Duality on Informativeness of Voluntary Risk Disclosure 
(N = 789) 
 
  Financial   
 Exp. Leverage Firm Size Profitability 
Variable Sign Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value 
Intercept (?) -0.158** 0.041 -0.173** 0.028 -0.213*** 0.010 
Xt (+) -3.871*** 0.000 -3.773*** 0.001 -3.485*** 0.002 
Xt+1 (+) -1.412 0.287  1.603 0.220 -0.768 0.556 
Xt+2 (+) -1.179 0.347 -0.555 0.661 -0.854 0.512 
Xt+3 (+) -1.764 0.162 -1.692 0.189 -1.317 0.323 
Rt+1 (–) -0.240 0.156 -0.187 0.276 -0.259 0.130 
Rt+2 (–)  0.128 0.389  0.214 0.168  0.067 0.676 
Rt+3 (–) -0.467** 0.029 -0.414* 0.051 -0.387* 0.066 
AGt (–)  0.015 0.512  0.057 0.163  0.043 0.179 
Ept-1 (+)  0.000 0.966  0.004 0.837  0.000 0.976 
RD (?)  0.061** 0.013  0.066*** 0.008  0.054** 0.027 
RD*Xt (?)  1.608*** 0.000  1.492*** 0.000  1.624*** 0.000 
RD*Xt+1 (+)  0.759* 0.070  0.793* 0.068  0.775* 0.058 
RD*Xt+2 (+)  0.473 0.233  0.091 0.835  0.442 0.265 
RD*Xt+3 (+)  0.633 0.111  0.691 0.121  0.593 0.137 
RD*Rt+1 (?)  0.005 0.915  0.005 0.915  0.004 0.926 
RD*Rt+2 (?) -0.048 0.335 -0.018 0.724 -0.049 0.322 
RD*Rt+3 (?)  0.176** 0.015  0.139* 0.058  0.161** 0.026 
RD*AGt (?) -0.006 0.442 -0.018 0.133 -0.014 0.131 
RD*Ept-1 (?) -0.000 0.982 -0.001 0.754 -0.000 0.938 
DUAL (?)  0.026 0.551  0.024 0.572  0.023 0.589 
DUAL*Xt (?)  5.327*** 0.004  4.320** 0.016  6.065*** 0.001 
DUAL*Xt+1 (?)  0.626 0.733  1.568 0.415  1.109 0.533 
DUAL*Xt+2 (?)  1.525 0.393  0.224 0.906  1.166 0.513 
DUAL*Xt+3 (?)  0.943 0.662  1.783 0.440  0.820 0.695 
DUAL*Rt+1 (?)  0.045 0.869 -0.036 0.896  0.039 0.884 
DUAL *Rt+2 (?)  0.128 0.644  0.066 0.813  0.071 0.796 
DUAL *Rt+3 (?)  0.623* 0.099  0.401 0.293  0.704* 0.060 
DUAL *AGt (?) -0.010 0.867 -0.013 0.811 -0.027 0.630 
DUAL *Ept-1 (?)  0.007 0.733  0.001 0.951  0.004 0.842 
DUAL *RD*Xt (?) -1.961*** 0.001 -1.717*** 0.003 -2.215*** 0.000 
DUAL *RD*Xt+1 (-) -0.345 0.588 -0.637 0.335 -0.510 0.415 
DUAL *RD*Xt+2 (-) -0.273 0.652  0.172 0.788 -0.126 0.834 
DUAL *RD*Xt+3 (-) -0.437 0.564 -0.719 0.368 -0.467 0.529 
DUAL *RD*Rt+1 (?) -0.019 0.827  0.011 0.903 -0.017 0.842 
DUAL *RD*Rt+2 (?) -0.050 0.583 -0.049 0.595 -0.033 0.711 
DUAL *RD*Rt+3 (?) -0.239 0.051 -0.165 0.178 -0.256** 0.034 
DUAL *RD*AGt (?)  0.002 0.906  0.001 0.923  0.006 0.730 
DUAL *RD*EPt-1 (?) -0.003 0.567 -0.001 0.794 -0.002 0.693 
Adj R2  10.39% 10.66% 11.44% 
*, **, *** significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 8  
 
Impact of Unmodeled Variables 
 
 Endogenous Financial   
 Variables Leverage Firm Size Profitability 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Regression 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Constant     -
0.278*** 
- 
0.285*** 
-0.323*** 
BC1: NED*RD*Xt+1  0.009***   0.010***   0.007** 
BC2: BS*RD*Xt+3  0.480***   0.440**   0.534*** 
Impact thresholds (BC1) 0.0364  
Impact thresholds (BC2) 0.0345   
Impact of control (BC1)  0.057       0.21        0.175 
Reliability (Impact/ITCV)  1.58       5.76        4.82 
Impact of control (BC2)  0.081 0.227 0.167 
Reliability (Impact/ITCV)  2.35 6.58 4.86 
*, **, *** significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed). 
